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“The Prison at Port Harcourt has been considerably developed and at the close
of the year there were 829 prisoners in custody and these are employed by the
Eastern Railway. The Engineer in charge at Port Harcourt is highly pleased with
the way the prisoners are worked; they have given no trouble and have been of
great assistance in developing that station. It was my intention to have 1,000
prisoners stationed there before the close of the year, but this was impossible as
two prisons...which should have supplied the drafts to make up the number, had
an outbreak of chicken-pox...”
- E. Jackson, Acting Inspector of Prisons, Lagos, 23rd April, 1915
Following a slew of academic and political work in postcolonial studies with anti-
colonial theses in the mid to late twentieth century, there has been a recent resurgence of
political, journalistic, and scholarly literature citing and debating the benefits of European
colonialism and British empire in particular for the economic development of former colonies
(Ferguson, 2008; Said, 1978). While much of this work has focused on evaluating the sup-
posed benefits of education and infrastructure projects spearheaded by British missionaries
and colonial officials in former colonies, there is relatively little work focused on investigating
the costs of this infrastructure, particularly relating to the contribution of indigenous un-
paid labor. Although recent research has begun estimating the contribution of “labor taxes”
or forced indigenous labor to the construction of public works projects like the railroads
and roads in the colonies, the literature remains thin regarding the use of another source
of forced labor, convict labor, in Europe’s colonies, particularly in the British context (van
Waijenburg, 2018; Hynd, 2015; Abiodun, 2017; Bernault, 2007).
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This is a significant gap in the economic history literature, particularly given that an
often explicitly stated strategy to fulfill the colonial government’s revenue imperative and
reduce costs associated with public works expenditure was to use convict labor, as shown
in the above 1915 quote from Jackson in his capacity as the Acting Inspector of Prisons in
Nigeria (Foreign and Office, 1937). A primary aim of this paper is to provide new information
that allows us to evaluate the importance of convict labor to the colonial regime. We do this
by providing quantitative estimates of the share of labor coercion in colonial revenues and
public works expenditure using evidence from prisons in British colonial Nigeria between
1920 and 1938. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to provide estimates on the value
of convict labor for colonial fiscal capacity in Britain’s African colonies.
Much of the work on convict labor and its use in industrial activities of ruling govern-
ments has focused on the role of convicts as “forced laborers”, performing legally unpaid,
unfree work in contrast with their wage labor peers (De Vito and Lichtenstein, 2013; van der
Linden, 2008; Adamson, 1984). The use of convict labor by government regimes extends as
far back as the 15th century with examples ranging from the Roman empire to the French
and Ottoman empires of the 16th and 17th centuries (De Vito and Lichtenstein, 2013; Brown
and Dikotter, 2007). The 18th and 19th centuries have been cited by historians like De Vito
and Lichtenstein (2013) as marking periods of significant increase in the use of convict labor,
largely driven by increased labor demand for industrial projects. This increased demand for
convict labor is described as occurring alongside the increased demand for free labor, par-
ticularly in European colonies in Africa, Asia and the Americas (De Vito and Lichtenstein,
2013).
One of the most well-known historical cases of the use of convict labor for industrial
projects is the United States in the 18th and 19th centuries, where laws like the Black
Codes and convict labor were part of a state-led effort to criminalize Black populations
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following the abolition of slavery in 1865 (Fogel and Engerman, 1995; Myers, 1998; Worger,
2004; De Vito and Lichtenstein, 2013; Browne, 2007). The US case shared many of the same
features of labor exploitation of indigenous populations for public works and private industry
consumption with American, African and Asian colonies under European control (De Vito
and Lichtenstein, 2013; Brown and Dikotter, 2007; Arnold, 1994; Paton, 2004; Worger, 2004).
In Britain’s African colonies, as in the French case outlined by Bernault (2007), convict
labor in the 19th through the mid 20th centuries, was a significant source of labor for public
works and industrial projects with work on road and railway projects, like the Eastern
Railway in Nigeria, in some cases almost entirely manned by prison labor (Hynd, 2015;
Akurang-Parry, 2000; Abiodun, 2017; Foreign and Office, 1937). The revenue imperative of
the British colonial effort, motivated largely by a concern with stabilizing fiscal capacity and
minimizing costs to the regime, and faced with chronic labor shortages in Africa, viewed
prison labor as an essential part of maintaining fiscal solvency, alongside direct and indirect
taxation in the colonies (Hynd, 2015; Akurang-Parry, 2000; Abiodun, 2017; Foreign and
Office, 1937; van Waijenburg, 2018; Gardner, 2012).
Labor shortages, driven in part by rising demand for labor for industrial activities like
railroad construction, viewed as necessary for minimizing the costs of transporting com-
modities to the coast for tax revenue and extending control over indigenous populations,
translated to high market wages that colonial officials were often unwilling to pay in efforts
to minimize costs (Gardner, 2012; Frankema, 2011). Like the Black Codes employed against
Black populations in the United States, one way in which colonial governments responded to
these labor demand pressures was to employ a number of coercive institutions including va-
grancy laws, labor registration and pass laws that criminalized indigenous populations, and
Native Authority Ordinances that mandated the conscription of African laborers to work on
colonial public works projects (Hynd, 2015; Akurang-Parry, 2000; Thomas, 1973).
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To estimate the contribution of convict labor to Britain’s fiscal resources and public
works expenditure in colonial Nigeria, we adapt the empirical strategy from van Waijenburg
(2018), and estimate the share of unpaid wages to prisoners in colonial revenues and expen-
ditures. We assemble a new dataset on prisoners, wages, and fiscal spending from British
colonial records over 1920 to 1938. We use this to estimate the value of unpaid wages to
prisoners or the value of labor coercion in colonial revenues and public works expenditure.
The results reveal a significant share of convict labor in public works expenditures in par-
ticular, ranging between almost 40% and 140% of public works expenditure through the
period of study. The imputed wages assigned to prisoners’ labor from colonial officials is also
significantly below the market rate, with prisoners’ labor valued between 60 to 80% below
market rate over 1919 through 1925 years of available data.
These findings add to the growing literature on the significance of domestic labor co-
ercion in fiscal capacity building in Europe’s African colonies, and help fill the gap in the
knowledge of the role of convict labor in funding colonial public works projects (Frankema,
2011; Hynd, 2015; Jumare, 1998; van Waijenburg, 2018; Hynd, 2015; Akurang-Parry, 2000;
Thomas, 1973). Given the ongoing debate on the effects of European colonialism on de-
velopment in Africa and Asia, the paper presents quantitative estimates, supplemented by
qualitative sources, on the costs of colonial infrastructure by examining the contribution of
the unpaid work of indigenous prisoners in these regimes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides historical background
on the use of convict labor generally and in British colonial Nigeria. Section 3 describes the
data and outlines our empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses our results estimating the
share of labor coercion in colonial revenues and expenditures using the prisons data. Section
5 outlines our robustness checks using alternate measures of wages and the value of labor
coercion and measuring the bias in our estimates. Section 6 discusses some of the wage
5
trends in our results with implications for our measure of coercion. Section 7 concludes.
2 Historical Background
2.1 Prisons and the Use of Convict labor
Of the many forms of forced labor, from indentured servitude and “labor taxes”1 to slavery,
that have received scholarly attention in economic history in recent years, the use of the
labor of incarcerated individuals in domestic contexts, remains relatively understudied in
the literature (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Acemoglu and Wolitzky, 2011; van Waijenburg,
2018; Bernault, 2007).
While there are multiple views regarding the classification of convict labor as discussed
in De Vito and Lichtenstein (2013), we focus here on convicts who are “forced laborers”,
performing officially unpaid, unfree work for a polity, in contrast with their wage labor
counterparts2. Recorded histories of the use of convict labor by state authorities extend as
far back as the 15th century, from regions as varied as the Roman Empire in the 15th century
with convicts working aboard galleys in maritime transport and naval combat, the 16th
century Ottoman empire’s naval galleys, and the 17th century French naval galleys (De Vito
and Lichtenstein, 2013). In the Ottoman empire, the use of prisoners extended from galleys
in the 16th century, to work in agriculture and small-scale industry by the beginning of the
19th century in Egypt (De Vito and Lichtenstein, 2013; Brown and Dikotter, 2007). De Vito
and Lichtenstein (2013) describe the rise of the use of convict labor for industrial projects in
the 18th and 19th centuries as going hand in hand with the increased demand for free labor,
particularly in the colonies in Africa, Asia and the Americas under European control.
1Including van Waijenburg (2018)’s recent work on the French corvée system of forced labor in the 19th
and 20th centuries in African colonies.
2Further discussion of Marxist conceptions of wage labor in capitalist settings as unpaid work are well-
noted, though beyond the scope of this paper. For more on this literature, refer to De Vito and Lichtenstein
(2013); van der Linden (2008); Adamson (1984)
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One well-known case of the use of convict labor for industrial projects was in the 19th
century in the United States of America, where laws, punishment and convict labor were
part of a regime of the criminalization of Black populations following the abolition of slavery
(Fogel and Engerman, 1995; Myers, 1998; Worger, 2004; De Vito and Lichtenstein, 2013;
Browne, 2007). The use of primarily Black prison labor to work on public works projects
like the roads or the railroad in the US South has been well documented in the historical
literature (Fogel and Engerman, 1995; Myers, 1998; Worger, 2004; De Vito and Lichtenstein,
2013; Browne, 2007). The US case shared many of the same features of labor exploitation
of domestic populations for public works and private industry consumption in the 18th,
19th and 20th centuries with American, African and Asian colonies under European control;
including the “agricultural penitentiaries” of French north Africa and the exploitation of
convict labor in De Beer’s Mining Company in South Africa (De Vito and Lichtenstein,
2013; Brown and Dikotter, 2007; Arnold, 1994; Paton, 2004; Worger, 2004).
The use of convict labor was often a significant part of the empire-building efforts of
European colonizers, with well-documented examples from periods of British, French and
Portuguese rule in the 19th and 20th centuries (De Vito and Lichtenstein, 2013). The
literature documents the transport of thousands of convicts to work on plantations and
industrial projects in British colonies in New SouthWales, Australia and from British India to
penal colonies in the Malay Peninsula, Burma, Mauritius and the Andaman Islands (De Vito
and Lichtenstein, 2013; Arnold, 1994). So significant was convict labor to colonial empire
building that De Vito and Lichtenstein (2013) write in their history of penal labor that
“an account of the imperial expansions of the nineteenth-century world remain incomplete
without acknowledging the centrality of penal labor to this process and penal transportation
as a key aspect of imperial sovereignty”.
Two main reasons for the use of convict labor emerge in this literature. First, prisoners
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were employed to work as punishment for crimes, as defined by regimes, and second, pris-
oners were viewed as a source of cheap labor, particularly for industrial projects during the
industrial booms of the 18th and 19th centuries (De Vito and Lichtenstein, 2013; Adamson,
1984). In Europe’s colonies, penal labor was viewed as a necessary component of punishment
with a civilizing effect on “native” populations who were stereotyped as lazy, and prone to
avoidance of work without outside inducement (De Vito and Lichtenstein, 2013; Adamson,
1984). As a source of cheap labor, conscript work was viewed as going hand in hand with the
economic development of polities, so much so that some historians cite the notable increase
in prisons in the latter half of the 19th century in the US as evidence for the connection
between business demand for labor and incarceration rates (De Vito and Lichtenstein, 2013;
Adamson, 1984).
In the US case, a series of laws from vagrancy laws and the Black Codes that limited
access to owning property, voting and laws that criminalized everything from loitering to
“breaking curfew”, sometimes served to increase the prison population in periods of higher
labor demand and increased labor shortages (Adamson, 1984; Myers and Massey, 1991; Fraser
and Freeman, 2012). The construction of public works projects like roads and railroads in
particular were sometimes entirely funded by convict labor with one example being the
Western North Carolina Railroad from 1855 to 1894 in the US (Abrams, 1976). Convict
labor has a long history globally and was an instrumental part of the industrial development
effort of the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries particularly in the Americas and Europe’s
colonies in Africa and Asia.
2.2 Prisons and Convict labor in British Colonial Nigeria
In this section we outline a brief history of the colonial convict labor system in Nigeria,
with a more detailed account provided in Archibong and Obikili (2018). van Waijenburg
(2018) examines one system of forced labor in France’s African colonies, namely the corvée
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system or so called “labor taxes” that mandated the transfer of hours of mandatory, unfree
work from France’s young African subjects to colonial projects. Similar systems of labor
coercion existed in Britain’s African colonies, with endemic labor shortages, the need for
labor on large scale public works projects in the 19th and 20th centuries- railroads and roads
in particular-, and a revenue imperative focused on minimizing the costs of administration,
driving the use of forced labor in Britain’s African colonies (Frankema, 2011; Hynd, 2015;
Jumare, 1998; Gardner, 2012).
In British colonial Nigeria, labor taxes and labor laws worked in concert with Masters
and Servants Ordinances, vagrancy laws, labor registration, pass laws and Native Authority
Ordinances that mandated the conscription of African laborers to work on colonial public
works projects (Hynd, 2015). Alongside the growth of coercive laws in the colonies, was the
increased use of the prison system and convict labor to work on private and public works
projects, particularly in the early part of the 20th century (Hynd, 2015; Akurang-Parry,
2000; Abiodun, 2017; Bernault, 2007). Individuals who refused or were unable to pay direct
or labor taxes or the fines associated with non-payment, or committed petty crimes against
the colonial regime or their Native Authorities, were arrested and placed in prison, after
which their labor was subsequently used to work on colonial public works projects. An
example of this is presented in accounts by Ekechi (1989) and Hynd (2015) where a sizable
number of the inmates in the Owerri prison in South-Eastern Nigeria were young men who
had resisted mandated labor under the labor regulations, after which they were imprisoned
and employed as convict labor. In Nigeria and the Gold Coast, Thomas (1973) notes that
convict labor was often used to manage labor shortages in cash crop production and mining
through the 1920s.
In Nigeria, as of the time of its amalgamation from two separate Northern and Southern
Provinces to a single entity under the governorship of Sir Frederick Lugard in 1914, the need
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for cheap labor combined with the reticence of indigenous workers to work at below market
wages on often grueling industrial railroad, road construction and other public infrastructure
projects, motivated Lugard to pass the 1916 Prisons Ordinances act giving, among other
things, control of the use of convict labor to the Governor (Kingdon, 1923; Abiodun, 2017).
The Prisons Ordinance along with the 1914 Native Courts Ordinance also outlined the
functioning of Nigeria’s dual prison system, with the colonial prisons under the management
of the Director of Prisons and Native Authority Prisons overseen generally by the local chiefs3
(Kingdon, 1923; Abiodun, 2017).
Colonial prisons served a dual mandate, functioning as centers of control and repression
of native populations, and a source of cheap labor, allowing the regime to address chronic
labor shortages by providing government administrators with a steady supply of conscript
labor (Saleh-Hanna, 2017). So significant was the role of prison labor in the revenues and
expenditures of the colonies, that in 1911, the Governor of Northern Nigeria remarked that
“The value (calculated at 2/3 of the market rate) of prisoners’ labor in connection with
public works, which would otherwise have had to be paid for in cash was 3,878 pounds. If
calculated at the ordinary market rates the value of the prisoners’ useful labor would have
exceeded the entire cost of the Prison Department” (Abiodun, 2017; Salau, 2015). Following
Lugard’s Order in Council act on July 20, 1916, colonial prisons were classified into three
types: convict prisons, with prisoners serving 2 or more years to life sentences, provincial
prisons, with prisoners serving greater than 6 months and less than 2 years sentences, and
divisional prisons, with prisoners serving less than or equal to 6 months sentences (Kingdon,
1923; Abiodun, 2017).
Most prisoners were unskilled laborers, with 65% to 90% of them in provincial or
3There is little historical information on the functioning of the Native Authority prisons, and we use
records on colonial prisons here. This means the number of prisoners presented here represent only a
fraction of the total number of people imprisoned during this period.
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divisional prisons, having short sentences of less than 2 years, mainly for defaulting on
tax payments, and minor offenses like petty thefts (Hynd, 2015; Foreign and Office, 1925).
Popular departments for the use of prison labor were Railways and Harbors, Native Admin-
istration, Police, Public Health and Education, particularly for short-term prisoners (with
sentences less than 2 years). A robust prison industry system including bakeries, tailor-
ing, shoe-making, carpentry, printing and blacksmithing, among others, meant that longer
term prisoners (with sentences greater than 2 years) were taught and tasked with learning
a trade like carpentry, basket making, and cloth weaving to create furniture, uniforms etc
which could be sold for cash returns that were remitted to the prison department’s funds
(Hynd, 2015; Foreign and Office, 1925). They were also tasked, as part of the partly puni-
tive, partly “reformatory” motivation of prison work, with hard labor including activities
like stone breaking and stone carrying.
Short-term prisoners were tasked with activities like “road construction, street clearing,
grass-cutting, wood cutting, sanitation, conservancy and farm work” with the labor of short-
term prisoners contributing significantly to public works projects like quarries in Abeokuta
province, coalfields in Enugu, industries in Lagos, and the Eastern Railway extending from
Port-Harcourt in Enugu province which used large gangs of prison labor (Abiodun, 2017;
Foreign and Office, 1937). The colonial government was heavily reliant on convict labor, with
many of the coal mining projects and railroad construction work in southeastern Nigeria,
for example through the early to mid 20th century, staffed by prison labor (Abiodun, 2017;
Foreign and Office, 1937).
The recruitment of prisoners for labor was also sometimes stated explicitly, as illus-
trated in Abiodun (2017)’s account of the response of colonial government officials to a
request for increased funds for the employment of wage labor by a British sanitary inspector
in 1923: “the officials asked the prison department to find ways to either increase the prison
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population or recruit convicts from outstation prisons to complete the tasks.”4. This use of
convict labor for colonial public works projects continued through the 1940s, and in some
cases the 1950s in British colonial Africa with between 1 in 300 and 1 in 500 Africans im-
prisoned over 1930 through the 1950s, in contrast with 1 in 2000 British natives in Britain
(Hynd, 2015). Though the historical literature has detailed the significance of convict la-
bor for colonial revenues and public works expenditure, this is the first paper that, to our
knowledge, attempts to quantify the share of forced African prison labor in British colonial
revenues and expenditures.
2.2.1 Colonial Classifications of Prison Labor
To estimate the value of prison labor and receive payment to the prison department from
outsourced conscript labor, prisoners’ labor was classified into three types: unskilled hard
labor, skilled hard labor, and light labor. Unskilled hard labor included work for which
“no training was needed”, with examples given including “coaling ship, grass-cutting, paint-
ing and refuse disposal”. Skilled hard labor included work for which “special training was
necessary” including jobs like “basket-weaving, brick-making, carpentry, clerical work, cook-
ing, laundering, mat-making, masonry and tailoring”. Light labor consisted of “easy duties
suitable to the bodily or mental infirmity of the prisoner” including “cell-cleaning, lamp-
trimming, sweeping and preparation of foodstuffs for cooking”’ (Foreign and Office, 1937).
We use data on market wages assigned to free wage laborers to estimate the overall value of
labor coercion in each year.
4NAI, CSO 26/2 09591 Vol.1 ‘Lieutenant Governor Southern Province to Resident Calabar Province:
Memorandum on Prison labor’ 23rd April 1923
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3 Data: Convict Labor and Colonial Public Finance
The primary source of our data for this study is the British colonial Blue Books, with
supplementary data from the colonial Annual Report on the Prisons Department. The
Blue Books were statistical returns that governors of British dependencies were required
to submit on an annual basis. They contain data and information on a wide variety of
topics such as revenue, wages, public works expenditure and, importantly for this paper, the
prison population. We assemble data in the colonial Blue Books from 1920 to 19385 to get
a representation of how our variables of interest change over time.
The goal of our paper is to understand the evolution of labor coercion over time,
specifically focusing on the use of the prison system and prisoners as labor. Our first strategy
is to estimate the size of unpaid wages by the colonial prisons. Given that prisoners were used
as free labor, how much would the colonial government have had to pay if they were required
to hire that labor from the labor market? To answer this, it is essential to understand how
wages evolved over time. We do this here using evidence from Nigeria over 1920 through
1938. A map of Nigeria with its provinces and colonial prison locations outlined is provided
in Figure 1.
The Blue Books report average market wages for different types of labor, including
unskilled labor. In Figure 2(a) we plot wages paid to unskilled laborers categorized alterna-
tively as “Labourers and Carriers” and “Unskilled Labourers” in the colonial records. The
data shows an overall downward trend in average annual wages over the period of study.
Wages start out relatively high in 1920 at £24, increase in the following year, peaking at
around £35 and then fluctuate through the 1920s period till around 1930 when wages crash
and remain relatively low at around £10 through the 1930s. Repeating the exercise and
5The Blue Books data is incomplete between 1914 and 1920 so we start in 1920 for completeness.
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plotting wages for workers categorized as “Bricklayers and Masons”, a category of workers
considered as akin to skilled labor in the Blue Books classification, in Figure 2(b) shows a
similar pattern; wages exhibit a general downward trend, but remaining relatively high at
around £60 in the early 1920s, then fall and remain lower through the 1930s, but with a less
steep slope than their unskilled counterparts.
The wages serve as a starting point for calculating the value of unpaid labor. The
second important variable needed is the prison population and its transformation over time.
The Blue Books also report the daily average number of prisoners in each of the colonial
prisons. Figure 3 shows the evolution in the number of prisoners between 1914 and 1938.
The average number of prisoners rises up until the late 1920s and then declines. Note, the
Blue Books and records from the prison department explicitly state that all prisoners were
required to work (Foreign and Office, 1937). The data on wages paid and the number of
prisoners allow us to calculate a measure of the value of unpaid wages, and study how that
measure evolves during the period of observation.
4 Results
We measure labor coercion by calculating the value of unpaid labor used through the prison
population. To calculate our measure of labor coercion proxied as the value of unpaid labor
over time, we adapt the strategy from van Waijenburg (2018). In essence we ask, ‘how much
would the colonial state have had to pay if they had to hire all these non-remunerated prison
workers for a market rate cash wage?’. This measure captures the benefits accrued from
labor coercion and examines how those benefits evolved over time.
We calculate the overall value of unpaid labor in each year as;
V alue of unpaid labort = Annual wagest ∗Number of prisonerst. (1)
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This gives us an overall value of benefits accruing to the benefactors of prison labor.
As a measure of wages, we use the annual average market wages paid to unskilled laborers
as recorded in the colonial records. These wages capture the wages for some of the types of
jobs that prisoners would have been required to perform, including felling trees and breaking
rocks to clear areas for road and railroad construction (Abiodun, 2017; Foreign and Office,
1937). To measure the number of prisoners we use the daily average number in prisons.
This measure takes the average of the number of people in prisons throughout the year and
captures the amount of labor that was available on a given day.
Figure 4a shows the progression of this estimated value of labor coercion accruing
to the colonial government over the period of study. The benefits decline from a high of
about £230,000 thousand a year, and on average continues to decline until our last year of
observation in 1938.
To get a sense of how large the value of labor coercion which accrued to the colonial
government was, we contrast it with various other expenditures by the colonial government.
The Blue Books report various other pieces of information on revenue and expenditure.
This information allows us to compare the relative value of labor coercion to other monetary
expenditure.
Specifically, we compare the value of labor coercion to overall prison expenditure,
expenditure on public works, and overall expenditure by the colonial government. Figure
4b shows the ratio of the value of labor coercion to overall prison expenditure. Two things
stand out. First the value of labor coercion accruing to the colonial government is larger
than the overall expenditure on prisons for most years pre 1930, with the ratio of value to
prison expenditure greater than one for five out of nine years between 1920 and 1930. The
ratio drops and remains below one after 1930, reaching .6 at its lowest levels. This implies, at
least from a profitability perspective, that the prisons were value for money, with the indirect
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returns on prisons positive once the value of labor was considered. The graph also shows the
trend of the decreasing benefits of prison labor coercion continues even after taking prison
expenditure into account.
Similar trends are also apparent when comparing the value of labor coercion to overall
spending on public works expenditure by the colonial government in Figure 4c. The value
of labor coercion is larger than overall public works expenditure in five out of the nine years
pre 1930 in the sample. The general trend shows a declining value of labor coercion to
public works expenditure ratio, with the ratio falling to about 40% of overall public works
expenditure in the 1930s.
Finally, comparing the value of labor coercion to overall expenditure by the colonial
government in Figure 4d shows that the benefits were economically significant. At its peak
the value of labor coercion from prison labor was equivalent to more than 3% of overall
expenditure. The relative value of these benefits decline throughout the 1930s period in
particular, plateauing at around 1% of overall expenditure in 1938.
Overall the data suggests that the value accruing to the colonial government from
convict labor was considerably large in the earlier years of the sample especially in the
earlier part of the 1920s, relative to other expenditure. That value however appears to
have had a generally decreasing trend, falling almost continuously throughout the period of
observation, with notable drops in the post 1930 period.
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Alternative Wage Measures
The value of labor coercion in Section 4 used the wages paid to laborers. Given the type
of work that prisoners were typically expected to do as described in Section 2.2, unskilled
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laborers are perhaps the best way to broadly categorize the value of prison labor. This
measure is however likely to underestimate the true value of conscript labor as some prisoners
might have accumulated skills. As a robustness check, we use a different occupation to
categorize prisoners. We use the average wages paid to bricklayers, a class of skilled labor,
as an alternative measure of the value of a prisoner’s labor. Using the same technique,
we calculate the value of labor coercion assuming that prisoners would have been paid as
bricklayers if they had to be paid by the colonial government.
Wages for bricklayers were significantly higher than wages for laborers as shown in
Figure 5(a). Hence, the value of labor coercion is also significantly higher if prisoners are
assumed to be used as bricklayers as opposed to just laborers. The declining trend is however
apparent through most of the sample.
Another alternative would be to use wages for unskilled urban labor as depicted in
Figure 5(b). Urban unskilled labor would theoretically be close to the minimum wage that
could be paid for workers in urban areas. This would therefore capture the theoretical
minimum value of what it would have cost colonial governments assuming that laborers had
no skills, although in the later years the wages for laborers is in some instances lower.
The evolution of wages for urban unskilled workers appears to closely mimic the wages
for laborers. Although laborers’ wages are higher in some years, there is a convergence over
time. The value of labor coercion using urban unskilled labor wages are lower on average
compared to when laborers’ wages are used, but the underlying implications are identical.
The value of labor coercion is still significantly large but declining over time.
5.2 Measuring Bias in Estimates
Using the daily average number of prisoners might not properly capture the entire sample
of prisoners whose labor was appropriated by the colonial government. Those who were
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charged but sent out on bail for instance would still have to commit their labor but would
not be counted as being in prison.
As an alternative measure to the daily average in prison, we use the number of people
committed to penal imprisonment in each year, that is the number of people who were
arrested and sent to jail for one reason or another and who were expected to serve penal
labor. The number of people committed to prison however does not imply that they spend
the entire year there. Since the Blue Books break down sentences into three categories:
those committed for over two years, those committed for between six months and two years,
and those committed for less than six months, we weight the number of people committed
to prison by the categories of their duration of stay. Specifically, we assume that those
with more than two-year sentences spend two years in prison, those between six-month and
two-year sentences spend one year and three months in prison, and those with less than
six-month sentences spend three months in prison. Finally, we assume that imprisonment
started at the beginning of the year hence one year in prison would run from January 1st
until December 31st.
Figure 6(a) compares the daily average number in prison to our weighted average
measure of people committed to prison for penal imprisonment in each year. The daily
average as measured in the Blue Books tends to be much lower than our weighted average
measure of those committed to prison. This is true especially in the earlier years of our
sample. There however seems to be a convergence in both measures over time.
Recalculating the value of labor coercion using our weighted measure of people com-
mitted to prisons shows that using the average number in prison underestimates the value
of labor coercion. At its peak the value of labor coercion is more than 60% larger when
using the weighted average of people committed for penal imprisonment compared to using
the average number in prison. The trend however remains the same with the value declining
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over time.
5.3 Alternative Estimates of the Value of Labor Coercion
As a final robustness check, we compare our estimates of labor coercion to the colonial
authority’s own estimates of the value of prison labor. In some years, the colonial authorities
published more detailed information on prisoners and their use of prison labor in annual
prison reports. In these reports they published the total value of labor of prisoners in Nigeria.
They described this as the amount of the prisoners’ earnings for the prison department during
the year, both in terms of cash and other estimates of labor value. This in essence was a
measure of the colonial authorities own estimate of the value of the labor provided by the
prisoners.
The colonial officials6 or directors of prisons recorded per diem estimates of the value
of labor between 1916 and 1921 in the Lagos colony and southern provinces for Nigeria.
Using the classification of labor into skilled hard labor, unskilled hard labor and light labor,
described in Section 2.2.1, hard labor, both unskilled and skilled are given a value of 5 pence
per day, with light labor given a value of 3 pence per day in 1916. Starting in 1917, skilled
hard labor is given a value of 1 shilling and 6 pence or 18 pence, unskilled hard labor is
assigned a value of 5 pence and light labor is assigned a value of 3 pence. The rates for
unskilled hard labor stay the same from 1918 through 1921, with no reporting on the exact
value assigned to skilled hard labor or light labor over this time. After 1921, the reports
appear to stop including information on the per diem value assigned to the different classes
of labor.
We compiled these estimates where available, and they provide us with comparable
data from 1919 to 1935. Figure 7 shows our estimates of the difference in the daily market
6For example, W.H. Beverly, E. Jackson or W. Reeder in the southern provinces over 1915 to 1921
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wage rate versus the prison rate in the Lagos colony and southern provinces for laborers or
unskilled hard labor and for carpenters and joiners and bricklayers and masons, two classes
of skilled hard labor. Lacking data past 1921 on the per diem prison rates, we assume,
based on the past record, that the rates remain stable through 1925. As shown in Figure
7, prisoners performing unskilled hard labor, which made up the majority of the prison
population (prisoners with shorter-term sentences), were assigned a value between about
60% to 80% below the market wage rate over 1919 to 1925. Figure 8 shows a comparison
of our measure of labor coercion against the estimates provided by the colonial authorities
of the value of prison labor. Our measure of labor coercion is significantly higher than the
estimates of the colonial authorities, though there appears to be a convergence towards the
later years.
6 Wage Trends and Qualitative Evidence
The overall value of labor coercion at its peak during the period of observation was significant,
surpassing overall prison expenditure in most of the pre 1930 period. It was also equivalent
to more than 140% of overall expenditure on public works at its peak.
We estimate our measure of labor coercion using both wages and the number of prison-
ers. Although both variables change significantly through our period of observation, certain
patterns are apparent. First, the number of prisoners increased during the earlier years,
peaking around 1927 before changing to a downward trend. On the other hand, wages for
both laborers and bricklayers tended to be much higher in the earlier years compared to
later years. Wages for laborers collapsed at around 1930 while wages for bricklayers showed
a slower long-term decline. If we assume that wages were exogenous then one hypothesis is
that the average prison population responded to lower wages.
From a theoretical perspective and from that of a party benefiting from labor coercion
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of the prison population, higher market wages heighten the incentive to increase the number
of prisoners whose labor can be used for free. Lower wages however decrease the incentives
for use of prison labor. The trends in prison labor suggest that colonial authorities were re-
sponding to the downward trend in wages and reducing the numbers of prisoners. The trends
in both the daily average number in prison and our weighted average penal imprisonment
show drops from the late 1920s.
There is some anecdotal evidence that the wage dynamics were exogenous (Foreign
and Office, 1925). Colonial revenues collapsed starting in 1927, only recovering after 1935
as shown in Figure 9. This was associated with the collapse in commodity prices and trade
during the Great Depression which supposedly put downward pressure on wages (Frankema
and Van Waijenburg, 2012). The downward trend in labor coercion through prisons could
therefore be in response to exogenous wage movements during the period. On the other hand,
the collapse in colonial revenues led to massive layoffs by the colonial authorities (Foreign
and Office, 1925). These layoffs may have been part of fiscal consolidation, but they may
also have been a means of wage repression. The drop in labor coercion from the prison
population may therefore imply a change in strategy away from prisons and towards a wage
driven strategy.
The patterns are however inconclusive but provide room for further research on how
the colonial authorities responded to changing wage dynamics, and if there were deliberate
attempts to increase or decrease the prison population in response to labor demand shocks.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we document the evolution of labor coercion through prisons in British colonial
Nigeria. Specifically, we show the evolution of the value of labor coercion from the early 1920s
up until 1938. We show that the implied value of labor coercion was significantly large but
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declined through the period of observation. We also show that convict labor made up a
significant part of colonial public works revenues and expenditures. We provide anecdotal
evidence that the evolution of the prison population is correlated with the evolution of wages,
with prison populations increasing when wages are high and falling when wages are low. This
provides empirical evidence, in support of the historical accounts, of the prison system being
used for both revenue and labor extraction in the British colonies. The paper adds to research
on the use of prisons as a tool for labor coercion, and one of fiscal significance in Britain’s
African colonies. It also opens up opportunities for further research on understanding how
the prison system influenced labor and market wages in the colonies and the long-term effects
of these policies on current development outcomes of African populations.
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Figure A1: Wages from the British Blue Books, 1920-1938
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Figure A2: British colonial officials in records from African countries under colonial rule.
Source: British online archives.
Figure A3: African laborers on a railroad c. 1930, Source: Alexander Keese, CEAUP, Porto
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